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ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR MIKE MANSFIELD
JAPAN NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
TOKYO, AUGUST 5, 1982

Speaking to an audience of journalists is always the
toughest challenge of all.

You are probably the single most

informed group on the entire range of international, political
and economic issues.
strong

fe~lings

And you are already well aware of my

about the vital importance of the

u.s. -

Japanese relationship, feelings which I have expressed
countless times over the past years.

It's almost as if I, being from Montana, tried to tell a
friend from Idaho how to harvest wheat, raise cattle, or break
in a new horse.

He already knows the basic facts.

However,

because I recognize the crucial role you play in conveying
information and interpreting events to both the general public
and key policymakers in both our countries, I welcome the
opportunity to lay out my views of the state of

u.s.

and Japan

ties in this summer of 1982.

I would like to begin my remarks with some words
concerning the new Secretary of State for the United States,

82-14R
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George Shultz.

I do so for the purpose of acquainting you with

his stated views on trade and defense as carried in the public
hearings on his nomination before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee last month.

In response to Senator Hayakawa's question on •trade
friction,• Mr. Shultz replied, •I think the biggest problem to
be worked out is access to the markets of Japan.

The Japanese

have taken some steps recently, important steps, that help in
that regard.
done.•

I think there are further things that need to be

Later he added, •I think at the same time we must

acknowl~dge

that one reason why there are so many Japanese

goods sold in this country is the Japanese have done a darned
good job of producing high-quality goods at a low cost, and
that is a great advantage to our consumers ...

I would say

further that while the imbalance with Japan is very large -and basically, it is undesirable to have that big an imbalance
with one country -- fundamentally, we have to look at the trade
picture on a multilateral basis and not get too wound up in any
one country.

On a multilateral basis we have a reasonably good

trade picture, all things considered.•

Senator Hayakawa later asked a question on defense.
•There has been a lot of criticism here about Japan not doing
enough to defend herself in view that Soviet ships prowling
around the Indian Ocean and other Soviet forces are in
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Sakhalin, in the Kurile Islands and so forth.

A resolution was

introduced jointly by a Republican and a Democrat saying it is
the sense of the United States Senate that Japan should
increase its defense spending to one percent of its GNP.
resolution has not yet been acted upon.

This

What do you think of

this?"

Secretary Shultz answered, "I think myself that it would
be desirable for Japan to step up a little more in the defense
arena.

I do have experience myself in dealing with the

Japanese.

They are a very consensus-oriented society.

talk things over.

They work at it for a while and it takes a

good bit of time to make a shift.
it!

They

Once they make it, they make

You can push on it to a certain extent, but you have to

respect their process.

But I believe we should make it clear

to the Japanese that we feel their efforts should be greater.
I think it should.•

senator Hayakawa then asked if pushing the Japanese in
this direction is counterproductive.

Mr. Shultz replied,

"Making clear to the Japanese what we think is fine.
Resolutions being passed by a body like this is one thing to
have happen; but I would question the wisdom of telling some
other country how to behave.•

secretary Shultz was approved by the Foreign Relations
Committee and the full Senate unanimously.

Secretary Shultz
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has visited Japan many times -- twice in the last two months
to meet with Prime Minister suzuki, Chief Cabinet secretary
Miyazawa, Dr. Okita, Ambassador Ushiba, Mr. Asao of the Foreign
Ministry and many other prominent Japanese.

He has a broad

understanding of the U.S.-Japan relationship as a result of
these many official and unofficial visits.
advocate of improved ties.

He will be a firm

He will, in my opinion, be one of

the best secretaries of state my country has ever had.
man of all seasons for all the right reasons.

He is a

I think the

Japanese will be very pleased with his selection.

Lately, I have become concerned by a sense of uneasiness
on both sides of the Pacific regarding the quality of the
u.s.-Japan relationship.

Recent events in the United States,

which I do not wish to dwell on, but which have captured the
Japanese public•s attention, have been blown up into
unnecessary crises.

However, I regard those issues as

relatively small abrasions on the larger body of our
relationship.

For now, we, on both sides, must not allow those

wounds to fester and infect the whole physique:

Preventing

this will require statesmanship and far-sighted judgment on the
part of leaders in both the United States and Japan because
lately there seems to have developed an atmosphere of mutual
recrimination between our two countries.

This is troublesome

not because the issues involved are unmanageable -- they are
quite manageable -- but because they seem to have spawned a
tendency on both sides to search for hidden motivations and
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prejudgments about each other.

A Pandora's box of old

.

stereotypes has been opened, letting loose some capricious and
negative elements that are hard to control.

In this atmosphere

it becomes very difficult for the two governments to resolve
the natural and inevitable disagreements that arise between two
countries as closely bound in both political and economic
kinship as are the United States and Japan.

As you know, I am strongly convinced that the single most
important bilateral relatipnship in the world is that between
the United States and Japan.
bilateral trade in the world.

We have the largest overseas
We share broad security

interests, which affect not only our own mutual security, but
also the security of the East Asian region.

The U.S.-Japan

Mutual Security Treaty has become the cornerstone of stability
in the Pacific.

The next century may very well be the Pacific

Era in world history and a strong, firm, U.S.-Japan
relationship will be a crucial factor in guiding and helping
the nations of the Pacific Basin develop and progress in the
directions we, and they, desire.

Furthermore, we have a strong

common interest in the strength and coherence of the Western
alliance and the stability of the international political
system.

More fundamentally, despite our different historical

and cultural experiences, the United States and Japan share a
faith in a democratic political system that is responsive to
the wishes of the people.

As the two leading economies among

the industrialized democracies, Japan and the United States
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hold a strong responsibility for promoting world economic
development.

The continue d close cooperation and coo rdination

between our two countries will be essential to ma intaining a
stable, free, and prosperous international economic sys t em.

In dealing with the occas i onal bilateral problems that are
inevitable, I believe we must be very careful to keep in mind
the fundamental importance of th i s relationship and the mutual
stake we all have in maintaining it .

Per haps the most

essential factor in maintaining a strong u.s.-Japan alliance i s
the effort we make on both sides to understand each othe r 's
point qf view.

No matter how compelling our basic mutual

interests may be, without the recognition that mutua l
understanding and frank, level-headed discussi o n between all i es
is essential, the relationship can suffer serious and needless
damage.

It is important first to distinguish between major
bilateral issues which deserve the attention of our leaders and
short-term transitory issues, which can be resolved through
reasoned exchange of opinions and calm candid negotiation at a
lower level of government.

One of the reasons that

U.S.-Japanese relations have developed so successfully over the
past 35 years is that the two governments have, on the whole,
managed to make this distinction.
one of our common sports, baseball.

The same practice applies to
Professional major league

games are watched over by experienced, senior umpires.
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Little league games are presided over by lower ranking
umpires.

It wouldn't make sense for a man who usually watches

over, say, a Yankees' game to preside over a junior high school
match -- and it is the same when dealing with bilateral issues
between

countries~~

To extend my baseball comparison, trade and defense are
major league issues.

But, the most immediate and politically

sensitive issue in u.s.-Japanese relations is trade.

As much

as we might like to separate economic and political issues,
trade friction between two countries inevitably becomes a
political concern.

I have already quoted George Shultz, our

new Secretary of State.

His comments may reveal some insights

into the direction of his thoughts.

But to illustrate the

enormity of our problem, I would like to present some sobering
facts.

Between 1980 and 1981, the U.S. trade deficit with

Japan increased by 59 percent to a total of $15.7 billion.
1982, it is expected to increase slightly more.

In

You should not

forget that this large trade surplus with the United States
tends to focus criticism on Japan in the political arena at
home, particularly when American politicians are feeling
pressed to reverse the recent highly adverse economic trends in
the United States.

Farm income in the United States is at the

lowest since the depression of the 1930s.

u.s. businesses are

now experiencing their highest bankruptcy rate since the
depression and unemployment, at 9.5 percent, is at its highest
level since 1941.

The continuing serious difficulties of the
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u.s.

automobile industry are well known, but the steel, rubber,

glass and machinery industries are also suffering badly from .
sluggish sales and plunging profits.

Hundreds of thousands of

people are out of work in the housing industry, which has been
rocked by the high mortgage rates.

The list of problems could

go on.

President Reagan's economic program is aimed at bringing
about a recovery from these economic illnesses, and I believe
it will succeed.

The Reagan administration, of course,

understands that the trade imbalance with Japan is not the root
cause of America's economic problems, and remains strongly
dedicated to the principle of free trade.

But once a

protectionist trend gathers steam in the Congress, it becomes
more and more difficult for the Executive Branch to fight every
piece of such legislation successfully.

For example, the Congress is currently considering some
so-called "local content" legislation which could require
automobile manufacturers to produce up to 90 percent of their
product in the United States in order to have access to the

u.s.

market.

The administration is strongly opposed to this

proposed legislation on the basis that it is highly
inflationary, harmful to the economy, counter-productive to

u.s.

auto industry's efforts to become internationally

competitive and a violation of the GATT.

Nevertheless, there

is no guarantee that -- in an election year -- the
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Administration can prevent this legislation from passing
Congress in some form.

There is no question that this would be

very damaging to u.s. relations with its trading partners
because it would signal that the United states has abandoned
its historic bi-partisan free trade philosophy.

Similarly, attention was focused several months ago on a
set of so-called •reciprocity• bills, most notably that
introduced by Senator Danforth.

The Administration supports

one version which would clarify our concern about reasonable
access to markets, without coming into conflict with our GATT
commitments.

However, when this bill reaches the floor of the

Congress, it will be open to amendment.

It is possible that a

number of extremely protectionist and harmful amendments might

•

be added.

Thus the reciprocity bill is still a vehicle for

protectionist forces in the United States.

Thus, the trade question is a major political concern for
Japan in its relations with the United States.

The major

problem for Japan is to find ways to modify those aspects of
u.s.-Japan trade which have been contributing to an attitude in
the United States that the Japanese market is closed and that
Japan is interested only in exporting.

There are two major

areas of opportunity for corrective measures by Japan:

first,

the continued liberalization of the Japanese market and second,
Japanese investment in the United States.
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The United States Government appreciates recent Japanese
efforts to open its markets.

I note, in particular, the two

trade packages that the Japunese Government has announced to
increase access of foreign products to the Japanese market.
However, Americans will be particularly concerned that these
measures are fully implemented.

In this vein, Secretary Shultz

noted during his Senate confirmation hearings that with regard
to the Japanese system of inspecting imported goods, •they have
committed themselves to streamline that and I think that we
need to watch that closely to help them to follow through.•

I would also like to underline my appreciation for Prime
Minister suzuki's statement at the time the second package was
issued and my hope that Japanese attitudes toward foreign
products will indeed give U.S. products better access to the
Japanese market.

Furthermore, I believe that additional

measures to open up the Japanese market -- particularly in
agriculture -- will be necessary in the months ahead.

Japanese investment in the United States is a direct means
of addressing the attitude held by many Americans that because
of liberal access to the American market the flow of Japanese
products to the U.S. is a major factor behind high u.s.
unemployment rates.

It is obvious, for example, that a major

objective of the proposed "local content• legislation is to
create more Japanese investment in the u.s. auto industry.
fact, this has already begun, the most outstanding examples

In
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being the Honda and Nissan auto plants in Ohio and Tennessee.
I strongly encourage Japanese auto companies to continue
expanding investments in the United States, both in vehicle and
parts manufacturing.

As I said earlier, I believe that the

Reagan economic program will lead to the revitalization of the
u.s. economy.

When this happens, the u.s. auto market will

pick up as well.

Those companies who already have a foot in

the door will, of course, have the advantage.

I also encourage Japanese investment in other sectors of
the American economy, particularly those most seriously
affected by the current recession.

I am happy to note the

interest of Nippon Kokan in purchasing a substantial share of
Ford's River Rouge steel plant near Detroit.

This investment

would allow about 5,500 American workers to keep their jobs in
one of the most depressed areas in the United States.
Investments such as these are not only good business, they can
also be seen as a kind of capital investment in the
u.s.-Japanese partnership at a time when one partner is
experiencing severe economic reverses.

Similarly, I strongly support lifting the prohibition on
the export of Alaskan oil and natural gas to Japan.

As you

know, there have been periodic discussions about this in
washington over the past year.

Lifting the prohibition would

enable Japan to import these products, if it proved
economically feasible to do so, reduce our trade deficit very
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substantially and further bind our countries through a
commonality of interests.

secretary Shultz seems to share this

view and so indicated at his confirmation hearings when he said
in response to a question advocating Alaskan oil sales to
Japan, •I wish you luck.

Why do you not include gas with the

oil?"

Until world economic recovery occurs there will be
increasingly strident demands all over the world for sreater
restrictions on trade.

It is our strong hope that new trade

restrictions will not materialize.
strongly opposes protectionism.

The Reagan administration

However, we will need Japan's

help in this endeavor if we are to have any hope of success.
By taking the lead in making itself more accessible to imports
and by increasing investments in the U.S., Japan can do much to
relieve protectionist pressures.

I believe that looking ahead

Japan, like the United States, will find that the long term
benefits of these measures outweigh the immediate, short term
costs.

The second major issue in

u.

s.-Japanese relations which

demands attention at the political level is defense.

Despite

the severe economic situation in the United States, Americans
are generally agreed that Soviet military advances and
aggressive behavior of the last few years must be met with a
firm stand by the Western nations.

As a consequence the United

States is currently engaged in an extraordinary effort to build
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its own strategic forces in response to the soviet buildup.
This is essential not only to u. s. security, but also to the
security of its al lies.

There is still a tendency in Japan to dismiss the
relevance to Japanese security of the growing soviet military
presence in Asia.

I believe this misses an essential point.

The Soviets are masters of using military power for political
intimidation.

If the current soviet buildup in the region is

not met by an appropriate U. s. and Japanese response, the
fundamental military balance in Northeast Asia will be placed
in jeopardy.

The United States is often portrayed as pressuring Japan
to make a fundamental change in its defense role.
the case.

This is not

The United states is simply asking Japan to improve

its own self defense capability, particularly in areas where
u.s. conventional forces are currently dedicated to the defense
of Japan.

This will be essential if

u.

s. forces are to be

deployed flexibly in response to crises in other areas without
diminishing Japanese security.

In asking Japan to do more, the United States is mindful
of the constitutional and political constraints with respect to
Japan's defense role.

We are not suggesting that Japan take on

any missions that would violate these constraints and we do not
expect Japan to play a regional military role in East Asia.
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Rather, we are urging Japan to take the steps necessary to
fulfill defense responsibilities it has already agreed to
undertake in three general areas.

The first of these tasks is to defend Japanese territory·
more effectively against conventional attack and to assist in
protecting the sea lanes of the Northwest Pacific up to a
distance of 1000 nautical miles.

The Japanese government

recognizes the weaknesses in the areas of air defense,
anti-submarine warfare, communications and logistics and has
emphasized improvements in these areas as it completes the new
five-year program which will start next year.

This program

will constitute a significant strengthening of Japan's
self-defense capability.

And while we welcome the new plan, we

encourage Japan to consider accelerating these efforts.

The second area for improvement is cooperation between
Japanese and U.

s.

military staffs in planning both for the

defense of Japan and for facilitative assistance to
forces.

Japanese cooperation in supporting

u. s.

u.

S.

bases under

the mutual security treaty is imperative if our two forces are
to work together effectively in an emergency.

Thirdly, we would like to see technical cooperation in
defense systems development become a two-way street.

The

United States has supplied enormous amounts of such technology
to Japan over the years. It is time to make these arrangements
reciprocal.
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We and the Japanese Government have no basic disagreement
with respect to objectives in the defense area.

Our

differences relate more to the pace at which these objectives
should be achieved.

In discussing U.S.-Japan relations, it is not sufficient
to focus only on handling the immediate bilateral issues we
face.

We must not neglect the longer term challenge of

expanding the web of ties between our two societies.

It is

essential that we develop a greater breadth and depth of
understanding to ensure that the inevitable bilateral problems
do not threaten the basic relationship.

We already have a solid base upon which to build.

In both

countries there is a reservoir of good will because of the
productive post-war relationship.

There are a large number of

private and governmental consultations and exchanges that bring
together Japanese and American leaders from a wide variety of
fields.

Academic institutions in both countries are giving

increasing attention to studies about the other.

Nevertheless,

there are still very real gaps in understanding.

A recent poll

showed that most Americans view Japan in economic terms, both
positively (such as industrious and intelligent) and negatively
(such as unfair and protective).

Japanese have more awareness

of the United States but in-depth knowledge is rare.

..
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In June, the Japan-u.s. Conference on Cultural Interchange
met in Tokyo emphasized in its final communique:
1) the urgent need to make better use of the me dia ,
particularly television, as t he most effective way to deepe n
public understanding of each other's country- - e s peci ally in
the United States where there are too few programs about Japan :
2) the importance of strengthening studies of the o t her
society and culture through university teaching and
professional training, especially in business management:
3) the need for more collaborative research on economic
subjects of mutual interest;
These steps together with expanded parliamentary and youth
and other exchange programs can lead to a better understa nding
in each country of the complexities of the other socie t y ,
erasing many of the stereotypes that now tend to dominate, an d
improving the mutual understanding tha t is the foundati on o f
our relationship.

Let me conclude with the basic points I wish to mak e .
Problems are inevitable in any bilateral relationship a s
important and complex as the u.s.-Japanese relation s hip.

These

issues can not be ignored; they must be dealt with effectively,
taking into consideration the legitima te interests and
circumstances of both parties.

At the same time differences and f rict i ons should be
managed in the broad context of a rela t ions hip that is based on

'.
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many common values and interests and in a manner that does not
weaken t hi s fo u ndation.

The f amily is an appropriate analogy--within a family
t her e ar e alwa ys differences between various members, but if
the b asic relationship is healthy, these problems are dealt
with i n a constructive manner that does not threaten the basic
i n te gr it y of the family unit.

I n t he family of nations the United States and Japan are
like t wo mature brothers.

One, Japan, is the older, but the

othe r, America, is the bigger.

They both have different

beha vior patterns but have learned to respect these differences
while cooperating for the greater family good.
tha t

Both realize

f u ndamental common interests must override the occasional

s quabble.

I am confident that close and healthy ties will not be
di s turbed by the occasionally heated debate over economic and
d e fe nse matters, and that our familial harmony and mutual
confidence will prevail throughout the final years of this
century and well into the next.

*

*

*

